Neues von den chinesischen Bodenpreisen.
That explains why the real fear for Chinese officials isn’t a fall in the amount of land sold, but volatility in the price of land, which would become a financial-stability issue.
The fear would be a 1990s Japan scenario, where land values crashed, walloping lending—and the broader economy—on the way down. That would be a disaster for China’s investment-driven growth model, which depends on steady credit growth.
So last year, when real estate sales slumped, local governments kept land prices stable. First, by reducing the amount of land sold, and second, having LGFVs buy land, they became buyers in prime spots previously favored by real-estate companies. It also helped that cities kept new home prices stable.
It’s hard to believe, but as real estate developers ran away from the land market last year, land prices in 300 cities surveyed by China Real Estate Information Corp. rose 6%.
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The motivation is similar to the US Federal Reserve propping up financial assets during the 2008 financial crisis, acting as the “buyer of last resort” when private sector demand fell. In the Fed’s case, it made a profit on the troubled assets it took on—once the market calmed down.And it’s possible that LGFVs can do the same. Economists are already seeing signs of a China housing market recovery this year.
Die Bodenkrise wird verschoben auf eine Krise der öffentlichen Finanzen. Es ist nicht anders als Europa 2010. Die grosse Kernschmelze bleibt für jetzt aus. Ob das Problem damit ganz auf den nächsten Zyklus verschoben ist, ist nicht gesagt; die industrielle Krise, die dem ganzen zu Grunde liegt, ist nach wie vor da, und Stoff für eine Bankenkrise ist immer noch vorhanden.
Das ist anscheinend das charakteristische an solchen zyklischen Krisen in den späten Phasen der grossen Konjunkturen: dass die Erholung immer problematischer wird, und das Risiko des Rücksturzes in die Krise länger anhält.
Aber die Kommunalbonds haben eine ähnliche Stellung für den Refinanzierungskreislauf des Kapitals, und tragen deswegen dasselbe Systemrisiko:
One of the two main sectors for offshore bond issuance in China – the other being the beleaguered property industry – could see risk spill over to the broader bond market and threaten systemic financial stability in the world’s second-largest economy, analysts said, although missed payments are more likely to be seen beyond the public bond market in the short run.
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“An unexpected LGFV bond default as a result of a gap in regional local government (RLGs) support … could lead to contagion in the onshore bond market, with implications for RLGs, financial institutions and [state-owned enterprise],” said analysts led by Martin Petch in a report on Wednesday.
